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Abstract
Over the last two decades the share of national income which accrues to labour
has followed a marked downward trend across a host of industrialised countries.
This paper attempts to assess the importance of several potential causes of
this phenomenon. We investigate compositional effects, the effect of declining
trade costs, changes in the market structure (concentration) and the effect of
low-wage competition between countries. Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that
lower trade costs and factors related to economic integration such as industry
concentration, the market power of ﬁrms and increased international low-wage
competition indeed affect the labour share. However, their effect has been quite
limited when compared to changes in the sectoral composition, the effects of
technological change, cyclical factors and changes in the prices of intermediary
goods.
1. Introduction
The age old debate on how to divide the national income pie between
capital owners and labour has in recent times been reignited by policy makers,
politicians, trade unions and the popular press. This renewed interest in factor
shares stems from the fact that over the last two decades, the labour share across
a host of industrialised countries has followed a downward trend, as opposed to
the periods in the 1960s and 1970s where the labour share of national income
IThis work is based on Hutchinson (2008). The authors would like to thank Iaonni Ganoulis,
Joep Konings, Vincent Labhard, Aidan Meyler, Fabrice Orlandi, Moreno Roma and Rolf Strauch
for their helpful comments and suggestions. The opinions are those of the authors and do not
reﬂect those of the European Central Bank or Eurosystem
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January 14, 2009was considerably higher. Furthermore, citing the decline of the labour share
has become somewhat of a popular rally cry for certain stakeholders seeking
to promote the ills of globalisation and the need to increase the taxation of
companies. Therefore, identifying those factors which help explain changes
in factor shares is paramount in order to facilitate both informed debate and
policy formulation.
While early studies assumed factor share constancy as one of the key
regularities characterising economic growth (e.g., Kaldor (1963)), subsequent
contributions have shown that factor shares have not been stable in the medium-
term with several explanations being proposed Blanchard (1997); De Serres
et al. (2001); Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003); Jaumotte and Tytell (2007);
Guscina (2007); Meyler (2001). Overall, no deﬁnitive theory or speciﬁc cause
is able to explain all changes in factor shares. What does appear to emerge,
however, is that explanations can essentially be grouped into temporary and
cyclical factors such as energy prices and adjustment costs, while others can be
viewed as being more structural in nature1
The structural factors affecting factor shares include, for example, changes
in the sectoral composition of economies, technological progress, labour market
policies, product market imperfections and increasing international economic
integration. This paper attempts to measure in how far the European economic
integration process has affected the labour share.
Within the EU, the Single Market programme, several waves of enlargement
and the introduction of the euro have all contributed to increasing European
economic integration over the last few decades. While previous studies ex-
amining the impact of globalisation on the labour share tend to focus on the
increasing role of emerging economies such as China and India in world trade
(e,g., Jaumotte and Tytell (2007); Guscina (2007)), intra-EU trade accounts
for approximately two thirds of all EU trade2.
This study therefore concentrates on the European integration process and
examines how declining intra-EU trade costs among developed economies
1For a detailed review see European Commission (2007).
2External and intra-European Union trade. Statistical Yearbook 2008.
2impact on the share of labour in national income.
The legacy of obstacles to trade in the EU and their subsequent dismantling
has had considerable implications on European industrial structure (cfr. Lyons
et al., 2001). While it is widely accepted that efﬁciency and welfare beneﬁts
emerge as a result of increased competition in product markets, European
countries have been considerably slower in adopting anti-trust legislation when
compared to the US (Mueller, 1996). In the founding Treaty of the European
Community, despite incorporating strict anti-trust rules, the emphasis was on
cross-border implications and not within country competition. It was not until
the Maastricht Treaty that antitrust legislation in certain countries converged
closer to European standards. Moreover, ﬁrms are ever more adept at employing
innovative strategies in order to ensure that any rents earned are protected
from strict regulation (Konings et al., 2001). Consequently, it would appear
to be of interest to examine if market structure developments which occurred
concurrently with the integration process in the EU have affected the labour
share in Member States.
An additional channel through which the process of European economic
integration might affect the labour share is through the increased mobility
of ﬁrms. As ﬁrms become ever more footloose, Member States increasingly
compete with each other as a means of attracting foreign direct investment.
Consequently, both workers and governments can become embroiled in a race-
to-the bottom, where only the country with the lowest wages or tax rates will
succeed in attracting ﬁrms and employment. This paper examines whether
increasing international competition contributes to decreasing labour share.
In examining these factors, a framework, building on the work of Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (2003) (BS) is developed. These authors estimate the impact
of changing technology, factor prices, adjustment costs and the bargaining
power of unions on the labour share. In order to investigate how European
economic integration affects the labour share, this study extends their model
and estimates the impact of declining trade costs, foreign competition and
changes in market structure. Although the empirical analysis of this paper
focuses on European economic integration, the theoretical framework also
applies to global economic integration. Since European economic integration
3was already under way when the globalisation trend started to strengthen, it
may shed some light on possible future effects of closer integration at a global
scale.
A signiﬁcant contribution of this paper stems from enhancing the measure-
ment of factors explaining the labour share. For example, previous studies
examining the impact of globalisation on factor shares use aggregated measures
of trade openness such as the ratio of trade to GDP (Guscina, 2007; Moral
and Gernre, 2007), while this study uses bilateral trade data at the industry
level to construct a measure of trade openness which is derived directly from
theory. In addition, the role of market structure is estimated by using mark-ups
and concentration ratios derived from ﬁrm-level data, which have not been
examined empirically in previous studies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the evolution of the labour share and the importance of compositional effects.
Some statistics on potential explanatory variables is given, such as the evolution
of trade costs and industry concentration. Section 3 then introduces a small
theoretical framework, making predictions on the direction of the inﬂuence of
some of the suggested explanatory variables. Section 4 presents the estimation
results and section 5 concludes.
2. Descriptive Analysis: The evolution of the labour share and composi-
tional effects
2.1. The evolution of the labour share





where LCE, LCs and VA refer to labour compensation for employees, labour
compensation for the self-employed and value added. A caveat in measuring
these variables relates to allocating taxes on production to labour and capital.













































Figure 1: Labour share of the EU15 (top panel) and separately for some large EU member
states (bottom panels), 1970-2005.
In the EUKLEMS database3 which is used throughout this paper all taxes on
production are allocated to capital.
The top panel of ﬁgure 1 shows the evolution of the labour share for the EU
as a whole. The picture clearly shows why the evolution of the labour share has
drawn much attention recently: whereas the labour share was at a high level
and even increasing in the 1970s this was followed by a signiﬁcant decrease
in the subsequent decades. In the later years the downward trend seems to
have bottomed out. The bottom panels show the evolution separately for a
selection of EU member states4. What emerges is that the behaviour of the
labour share on the EU level is reﬂected on the national level in most member
3This dataset contains detailed industry level information for the period 1970-2005. For
additional details on this dataset see www.euklems.net.
4In the remainder of this paper ‘member states’ refers to the EU-15. The selection of member
states is solely based on the availability of trade data, which will be used to calculate a proxy
for trade costs in the empirical analysis later on.
5states. Some countries such as France and Italy have experienced considerable
decreases. For countries such as Belgium, Spain and the UK, the labour share
in 2005 was similar to the level in 1970, however, and Portugal is an exception
which experienced a signiﬁcant increase. In more recent years, the decline in
the labour share appears to be slowing down, or has even started to increase
again, for example in the UK.
2.2. Decomposition of changes in the labour share
A simple and highly relevant potential explanation for the observed change
in the aggregate labour share might be the occurrence of changes in the
composition of the economy, rather than a change in the labour share of the
economy as a whole. Since the time span under consideration is rather long
(35 years), major compositional shifts such as the declining importance of the
manufacturing sector and the increasing weight of services in the economy
may play a major role in causing the observed aggregated behaviour, if these
sectors have different labour shares. In this section, the relative importance of
compositional changes versus changes within the composing units is examined
more formally using the same decomposition as used by De Serres et al. (2001).
These authors write the aggregate labour share of a multi-sector economy as














where the variables compi,t and vai,t are the labour compensation and value
added in sector i in year t, !i is the share of sector i in the total economy
value-added and LSi is the labour share of sector i. Differentiating over time,
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Figure 2: Decomposition of the evolution in the labour share of the EU15.
where the ﬁrst term shows the effect of changes in the weight of sectors, offering
an indication of the quantitative importance of the ‘compositional effect’ in
changes of the aggregate labour share. The second term is the weighted sum
of the change in labour shares within each sector (‘within effect’).
Figure 2 shows the decomposition of the change in the aggreage labour
share of the EU 15. The bars in each ﬁgure show how the growth in the labour
share in the decade preceding the indicated year can be decomposed into the
change in the relative weight of forty six nace 2 industries (the ‘compositional
effect’) on the one hand and the change of the labour share within these sectors
on the other (‘within effect’).
Appendix B shows the sectoral decomposition of the movement of the
labour share separately for all member states im our sample. What emerges is
that there are large differences between countries in the relative importance of
within and compositional factors as explanatory factors of the changing labour
share. The compositional component has tended to decrease the aggregate
labour share in most countries over the time period under consideration, with
the notable exception of Portugal. The within-sector changes have been an
important driver of the labour share, although the direction of the inﬂuence
has been less clear cut.
We can therefore conﬁrm the ﬁnding of De Serres et al. (2001) (who use a
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Figure 3: Decomposition of changes in the labour share in within ﬁrm changes and changes in
the relative importance of ﬁrms in the overall economy.
help explain a signiﬁcant part of the decline in the labour share on the aggregate
level. As can be seen from ﬁgure 6, the ‘within effect’ for the EU15 clearly
outweighs the ‘compositional effect’, however, and therefore the changing
composition can not serve as a complete explanation for the observed decline
in the labour share.
However, changes in the relative importance of sectors may not be the only
type of compositional change in the economy which affect the evolution of
the labour share. If the ﬁrm size distribution was affected by the European
integration process, for example, and larger ﬁrms have a different labour share,5
we may expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcant inter-ﬁrm compositional effects. Figure 3
presents the results of applying the same decomposition method to a sample of
46015 Belgian ﬁrms for the years 1998-2006. The ﬁrm level data comes from
the commercial database Belﬁrst of Bureau Van Dijk. Overall, the change in the
relative weight of ﬁrms (‘compositional effect’) appears to have had a negative
inﬂuence on the aggregate labour share over the period under consideration,
which was also the case for the sectoral decomposition. On average, the labour
shares of individual ﬁrms increased signiﬁcantly in the years 2001-2002, during
5We will argue below that this might be the case if large ﬁrms have more market power, or
are more footloose, for example.
8the economic downturn in that period, suggesting that cyclicality may be an
important factor in explaining changes in factor shares.
The signiﬁcant size and ambiguous direction of the within component, both
at the ﬁrm and sector level suggests that a signiﬁcant share of the observed
variance of factor shares cannot be explained by compositional effects, and that
there might be other fundamental factors driving factor shares. Moreover, the
decomposition methodology remains silent on the causes of the differences in
the initial (or simply long-run) levels of the labour share in the units under
consideration. The remainder of this section will show a descriptive analysis of
some popular explanations the declining labour share.
2.3. Inspecting the evolution of trade openness
Globalisation is often seen as one a possible cause of the declining share of
labour in national income. A prediction of the classic Heckscher-Ohlin model
of international trade is that the reward to labour in relatively capital intensive
countries (such as the countries under consideration) declines after opening
up to trade. More recent models of union wage demands with footloose ﬁrms
predict that when ﬁrms become more footloose, they might be able to limit
union wage demands by threatening to relocate. Globalisation may also affect
the average size of ﬁrms (or the entire ﬁrm size distribution), and the fashion
or intensity of competition between ﬁrms. Larger footloose ﬁrms with more
market power may be expected to pay out a smaller share of their value added
to employees. To investigate the aggregate effect of globalisation through such
channels the measure of trade openness as derived by Head and Ries (2001) is
calculated from bilateral trade data at the industry level. Head and Ries (2001)
argue that under reasonable assumptions following measure  of the ‘freeness
of trade’ which is inversely related to trade costs can be calculated using only





















Figure 4: The evolution of trade openness with respect to the EU
Here, mijkt is the value of the trade ﬂow of industry k from country i to country
j at year t and miiktis the trade ﬂow of industry k to itself (or exports to itself)6.
The value of  ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating prohibitive trade costs and
1 costless trade.
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of trade openness () with respect to
the EU15 for a selection of large member states plus Norway, for the period
1980-20037.
What transpires is that the degree of trade openness increased signiﬁcantly
over this period. Spain became much more integrated following its accession to
the EU in 1986. Norway did not experience the large increase of trade openness
with respect to the EU such as Spain and the other member states, strongly
suggesting that the European integration process through various policies
implemented by the EU was the main driver behind the intra-EU decline in
trade costs. The fact the decline in the labour share occurred concurrently with
this signiﬁcant decline in trade costs makes it suggestive to draw conclusions
about a causal relationship. The fact we observe both the labour share and the
6This is calculated as production minus exports.
7Trade data is not available for Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Cyprus.
10measure for trade openness over many years, for different countries, and for
different industries will allow to investigate this hypothesis in a more formal
framework in section 4, where we will also be able to control for other factors
affecting the labour share.
2.4. Globalisation and market structure
For some, globalisation for many brings the image of large multinationals,
who by their sheer market power are able to exploit the local workforce, or at
least are able to limit the bargaining power of labour unions. In this section
we brieﬂy consider whether increasing economic integration indeed has been
accompanied with increasing concentration and higher markups for ﬁrms.
For this analysis we draw on the reported company accounts of European
manufacturing ﬁrms from the AMADEUS database. This commercial database
collected is by Bureau Van Dijk8. The data is based on a standardised format
of company accounts with the data covering balance sheet, and proﬁt and
loss variables. Merging several earlier versions of the database, measures for
industry concentration in the manufacturing sector for the period 1991-2005
are constructed9.
Using this dataset we calculate concentration measure, expressing the share
of sales of the largest ﬁrms in an industry. Very few ofﬁcial statistics report
concentration ratios at the 2 digit nace level so by using individual ﬁrm level
data it is possible to calculate industry speciﬁc concentration ratios. The data
comes from merging different versions of the AMADEUS dataset and spans the
period 1991-2005.
This table reveals some remarkable facts about the evolution of market
concentration in the EU over a period 15 years which has been characterised
by intensive economic integration. The ﬁrst column of the table shows the
evolution of sales of the single largest ﬁrm in each industry in our sample, as a
share of total sales in that industry. There has been a substantial increase in the
8Previous papers to use the Amadeus dataset include Huizinga and Laeven (2007); Klapper
et al. (2006); Budd et al. (2005).
9The data coverage in Amadeus varies across countries with Spain, Italy, France, Belgium
and the UK being the most extensively covered.
11year c1 c2 c4 c8 c16 c32 m
1991 0.195 0.280 0.387 0.509 0.644 0.752 0.279
1996 0.217 0.291 0.391 0.507 0.634 0.738 0.256
2001 0.235 0.307 0.403 0.509 0.625 0.726 0.252
2005 0.252 0.309 0.398 0.507 0.623 0.724 0.245
Table 1: Concentration measures and the Lerner index m
relative sales of the largest ﬁrm over the years covered in our sample. Which
ﬁrms lost in terms of the sales share? The next 6 columns of the table show the
share of sales made by the 2,4,8,16 and 32 largest ﬁrms respectively. Consider
the c2 measure. If the two largest ﬁrms gain a total of 2.9 percentage points in
sales, but the largest ﬁrm on its own gains 5.7 percentage points, this implies
the second largest ﬁrm actually lost market share, on average. Similarly, the
other c-measures indicate a loss of market share for the largest ﬁrms with the
exception of the single largest ﬁrm, relative to all other ﬁrms in the economy.
This descriptive analysis points to a speciﬁc kind of evolution in the ﬁrm
size distribution, where only the very large ﬁrms grow even larger, and the rest
of the distribution seems be become less skewed, somewhat more uniform. A
possible cause could be that due to the European integration process only the
very large ﬁrms are able to compete on the truly trans-European level, and this
segment underwent a period of intensive consolidation to reap the beneﬁts
of production on a larger scale, whereas for the majority of ﬁrms, European
integration brought mainly an intensiﬁcation of competition, both competition
from abroad and competition from smaller ﬁrms, which were able to increase
their market share during the period under consideration.
Since the analysis of the evolution of market concentration shows a mixed
picture, it is hard to predict this evolution translated in to shifts in the average
market power of ﬁrms10. The last column of table 2.4 shows the evolution of
the average mark-up in all countries and sectors as measured by the Lerner-
index11. Clearly, the average markup seems to have declined over the years in
10Of course, there is more to the evolution of market power in a sector than the evolution of
concentration.
11These are estimated using the method of Hall (1988).
12our sample.
To investigate whether these trends in concentration and market power
relate to the European integration process, a small regression analysis was done,
the results of which are shown in table 2. While controlling for country-sector





constant 0.628 0.213 0.292
(0.0198) (0.0245) (0.00733)
Observations 1045 1183 1957
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01
Table 2: Fixed effects regressions relating trade costs, market concentration and the markup
ﬁxed effects, these regressions conﬁrm the intuition that (column 1) increasing
freeness of trade  has is associated with with a decrease in concentration;
(column 2) increasing concentration is associated with higher markups; and
(column 3) increasing freeness of trade  is associated with lower markups.
How and to what extent these factors can help explain the declining labour
share will be the subject of sections 3 and 4 respectively.
3. Theoretical Framework - Factors driving factor shares
This section presents a theoretical framework which can be employed to
understand how different factors can be expected to affect the share of labour in
national income. We commence by introducing the basic framework developed
by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). These authors show that with a constant
returns to scale technology with capital and labour as sole factors of production,
and allowing for labour augmenting technological change, a strictly monotonic
relationship emerges between the labour share and the readily observable
capital-output ratio. BS then discuss several deviations from this framework
13and how they can be expected to shift the relationship between the labour
share and the capital output ratio. We will proceed in a similar fashion. The
basic framework of BS in described in section 3.1. Section 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and
3.1.4 discuss respectively how capital augmenting technological change, prices
changes of intermediate goods and hiring and ﬁring costs affect the relationship
between the labour share and the capital output ratio. Section 3.2.1 examines
possible channels through which declining trade costs and foreign competition
could affect factor shares, while section 3.2.2 examines the effects of changes
in market structure.
3.1. The basic framework of BS
3.1.1. The benchmark BS model
To explain changes in the labour and capital share, it is necessary to make
some assumptions on the technology of ﬁrms. In light of this, our starting
point is the same ﬂexible speciﬁcation for technology as in BS. In their model,
output (Y) is produced using labour (L) and capital (K), with Y = F(K,BL)
and F is homogeneous of the ﬁrst degree. The parameter B allows for labour
augmenting technological progress. Deﬁne l = BL=K and f (l) = F(1,l), which









Writing k = K=Y = 1=f (l) for the capital-output ratio shows that there exists
a one-to-one relationship between l and the capital-output ratio k, as f is
monotonic.
In the case of perfect output and labour markets, labour demand is deﬁned
by setting the marginal cost of labour equal to marginal revenue wc = pBf 0,
where wc stands for the competitive wage, p is the market price and f’ is the






where the second equality follows from the fact that k = 1=f (l), and thus
deﬁnes a one-to-one relationship between the readily observable capital-output
14ratio k, l and the labour share. Various elements contained in this simple
framework, such as capital accumulation, changes in factor prices of labour and
capital, labour augmenting technological change do not affect this relationship
between the capital-output ratio and the labour share. What follows in the
remainder of this section is a discussion of several important deviations from
the base model which could offer alternative explanations for the observed
change in the labour and capital share
3.1.2. Capital augmenting technological change
An important stylised fact of economic growth over the last hundred years
is the relative constancy of the rate of return to capital and the steady increase
of wages over time. Acemoglu (2003) recently developed a theoretical model
with a constant rate of return to capital, increasing wages and a constant labour
share along the equilibrium long run growth path. In his model, ﬁrms can
invest in labour and capital augmenting technological change. In the long
run, ﬁrms optimally invest only in labour-augmenting innovations and the
share of labour in national income is constant. After a shock, however, there
might indeed be capital-augmenting technological change with the possibility of
factor shares deviating from their long run equilibrium levels. These empirical
and theoretical ﬁndings suggest that modelling technological change as purely
labour augmenting is a reasonable approximation.
The model of Acemoglu (2003) suggests capital augmenting technological
change might occur off the steady-state growth path, and this is accompanied
by changes in the factor shares. The BS model is not dynamic, but allowing
for capital augmenting technological change in the production function via
Y = F(AK,BL), changes equation 6 into
LS = Akg(Ak)f
0(g(Ak)). (7)
This clearly shows that capital augmenting technological change induces shifts
of the entire LS   k relationship.
153.1.3. Intermediary input prices
Changes in the relative prices of additional factors of production, such
as materials or energy and services equally shifts the entire LS-k schedule.
Assuming Y = F(K,BL,M), where M stands for materials, for example, makes
the labour share a function of the capital-output ratio, but also of the real price
of the material input q=p. Assuming CES as speciﬁc functional form of the
production technology BS show that the more labour and capital are substitutes
(complements), the more a rise in the price of material inputs will decease
(increase) the SL-k schedule and thus, assuming a constant capital-output ratio,
a lower (higher) labour share.
3.1.4. Counter-cyclical labour share: adjustment costs
In addition, a key characteristic of labour markets in general and particularly
in many EU Member States, is that they are rigid. If it is expensive for ﬁrms to
hire and ﬁre workers, this will affect how the labour share behaves throughout
the business cycle. If ﬁring a worker is expensive, then labour demand will
remain above the frictionless level as the real marginal cost of labour is lowered
by the ﬁring cost. This implies that, all else being equal, the labour share will
increase during economic downturns. The reverse also holds in presence of
hiring costs and economic upturns12. This paper follows the approach of BS,
controlling for adjustment costs by including the growth of employment in the
labour share regression (with a negative coefﬁcient expected).
3.2. Additions to the BS model
3.2.1. Economic integration and footloose ﬁrms.
Increasing foreign competition and the risk of ﬁrms relocating to other
jurisdictions in the pursuit of cost savings, are often perceived as factors which
limit the scope for union wage demands and as an important source of the
downward pressure on wages and thereby, the share of labour in national
income. In this section, a small theoretical framework is developed, where the
12The relationship between the labour share and cyclicality is examined in several stud-
ies. Kydland and Prescott (1990), show that in OECD countries, the labour share is indeed
countercyclical. Vermeulen (2007) corroborates this ﬁnding for France.
16optimal union wage demand is affected by economic integration and foreign
competition13.
Assume an economy containing unionised ﬁrms in which bargaining takes
place over both wages and employment (efﬁcient bargaining). Unions aim to
maximize the total wage bill wL and take employment at the competitive wage
wc as an outside option during wage negotiations. Firms seek to maximize
their proﬁt pY  wL and take the net potential foreign proﬁts  as their outside
option (threatening to relocate should negotiations fail). Although a full model
describing foreign proﬁts is not developed,  can reasonably be assumed to
be a function of relocation costs and foreign wages or some other measure
of foreign production costs. Bargaining cooperatively, the union and the ﬁrm
maximize the generalized Nash product





by setting wage and employment levels.  and 1  measure union and ﬁrm
bargaining strength respectively. Taking the derivative with respect to wages,
the bargained wage can now be expressed as the weighted average of the union
outside option wage and the surplus of revenue above potential foreign proﬁts,
per worker
First, consider two extreme cases. In the case where unions do not have
any bargaining power ( = 0), then wages are equal to the competitive wage
wcprevailing in non-unionized ﬁrms. On the other hand, if unions have full
bargaining power ( = 1) and ﬁrms do not have an outside option ( = 0,
for example due to moving costs being prohibitively high), then unions are
able to appropriate all of the operation rents pY in the form of higher wages.
In this scenario, wages are equal to the operating revenue per worker, the
maximum wage which can be paid without making losses. However, if ﬁrms
can credibly threaten to relocate ( > 0), bargaining takes place only over
pY  . In the limiting case where foreign proﬁts equal the operating proﬁts
of a non-unionised ﬁrm  = pY   wcL, the threat of delocalisation is perfect
13 This approach is in line with that of Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991).
17and the union can not make any wage demands above the competitive wage,
irrespective of its bargaining power.
Using the expression for the bargained wage in equation , the following

















From equation (9) it is clear that the labour share still depends on the capital-
output ratio through k (as it did in the perfectly competitive case), but now the
labour share also depends on the bargaining power of the union and the level of
potential foreign proﬁts, which are in turn affected by foreign wages. Transport
costs do not necessarily alter the level of potential foreign proﬁts, but they do
alter whether these are relevant during wage negotiations: if transport costs
are very high, ﬁrms do not have the choice to relocate (a part of production)
and supply local customers from abroad. If ﬁrms cannot threaten to relocate,
this solution coincides with BS (cf. p.14 in their article). Alternatively, if
ﬁrms become more footloose (for example because trade becomes freer) or if
foreign wages decline, then relocation becomes a more credible threat. This
would then result in lower wages and a lower labour share. Therefore, foreign
wages and a measure for the openness of trade  are included as explanatory
variables when modelling the evolution of labour and capital shares. A detailed
description of the trade openness measure is presented in section V .
3.2.2. Market structure, economic integration and markups
If output markets are not perfectly competitive, optimal labour demand no
longer follows from wc = pBf 0. In this situation, ﬁrms hire labour up to the
point where marginal costs wc equals marginal revenue p[1+1="], where "
refers to the price elasticity of the demand for output of the ﬁrm. The labour
demand equation then becomes wc = pBf 0[1+1="] = pBf 0=m. Here m is the
Lerner index, the factor by which prices exceed the marginal cost of production.




Or in the case of efﬁcient bargaining (assuming unions ignore the effect their











In the workhorse Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition markups are
constant and solely depend on the parameter controlling the price elasticity
of substitution between varieties. Despite the many advantages of the Dixit-
Stiglitz framework, the fact that markups are constant has long been recognised
as a rather unrealistic property of this model. Since then, various models of
international trade have been developed where markups are time variant and
depend on, for example, trade openness () (see Ottaviano et al., 2002), or
the extent of concentration () in an industry (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
Following from this, in this paper, the markup m is assumed to be a function
of trade openness and concentration, with m < 0 and m > 0. The reverse
effects also hold for the labour share, which - at least as far as the effect through
changes in the markup - is increasing in the openness of trade and decreasing
in the level of concentration. It is worth noting that even in this simple model
the predicted effect of trade on the labour share is ambiguous. Freer trade
simultaneously increases the outside options of ﬁrms (leading to a lower labour
share) while also decreasing their market power (increasing the labour share).
4. Empirical estimation
As outlined in section 3.1, the framework of BS suggests augmenting fol-
lowing basic relationship
log(LSt) = 0 +1log(Kt=Yt)+"t, (11)
19with several explanatory variables which cause deviations from the LS-k rela-
tionship. Our preferred estimation speciﬁcation takes the following form





it +7it +8mit +"it
(12)
where for each year t and sector i log(LSit) represents the log of the labour
share, log(Kit=Yit) is the log of capital-output ratio, log(TFPit) is the log of total
factor productivity, log(pI
it=pit) is the log of intermediates prices, log(Lit)
represents employment growth, wF
it is the log of foreign wages, it trade
openness and mit are proxies for the market power of ﬁrms such as industry
level markups and concentration levels.
4.1. Results
When estimating equation 12 in levels the test by Wooldridge (2002)
strongly rejected the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Estimation
therefore was done after taking ﬁrst differences.14 Table 3 shows the result of
estimating equation 12 on ﬁrst differences, using OLS with country/industry
ﬁxed effects and year dummies, Table 3 does not include the concentration
measures, as these are available only for the years 1991-2004, and therefore
including them would substantially reduce the sample size. The sample in 3
covers the years 1980-2001 and contains 96 country/sector combinations. The
same sample is retained over the different reported speciﬁcations, as to obtain
comparable results.
Column 1 shows the results including most of the covariates suggested
by BS. All coefﬁcients have the expected sign and are signiﬁcant. The fact
the coefﬁcient on logcapoutput and logTFP have the same sign is as expected
under the assumptions of BS. The coefﬁcient on loginterprice is positive and
large, which is in contrast to the rather small effect measured by BS using the
relative price of oil. A partial explanation for this could be the fact we include
all intermediate inputs. The coefﬁcient on employment growth is negative
14Regressions using the Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator lead to the quantitatively identical
results
20Dependent variable: loglabshare (1) (2) (3)
logTFP  0.602  0.602  0.605
(0.0197) (0.0202) (0.0202)
logcapoutput  0.101  0.101  0.0962
(0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0149)
loginterprice 0.407 0.407 0.413
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0140)








Observations 1886 1886 1886
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01
Table 3: Estimation of the basic equation and extensions
indicating that there is weak evidence for the existence of adjustment costs
with ﬁrms retaining more staff during economic downturns (leading to a higher
labour share) as compared to the frictionless case.
Column two shows includes  as an explanatory variable. The short theo-
retical considerations made in the last section suggests the sign on this variable
can not be readily predicted. Whereas freer trade is expected to make ﬁrms
more footloose and thus limit the bargaining strength of unions and thus lead-
ing to a lower labour share, freer trade is simultaneously predicted to increase
the labour share if freer trade implies lower markups. Given the fact this
variable is a widely accepted measure of trade costs and has been meticulously
constructed using country-sector level data for a long time period, the fact the
estimated coefﬁcient is not statistically different from zero might come as a
disappointment. It is important to note, however, that the coefﬁcient is actually
rather precisely estimated. Although it can not be conﬁdently be stated that
the effect of freer trade is positive or negative, it is known with a high degree
of certainty that the coefﬁcient is neither very small or very large.
21The last column of table 3 controls for some of the channels through which
we expected trade liberalisation to affect the labour share, while allowing for a
direct effect of trade freeness, via channels not covered in the model. Foreign
wages and the industry level lerner index as used as proxies for foreign low-
wage competition and the market power of ﬁrms respectively. Higher foreign
wages are predicted to increase union leverage 15, and indeed the estimated
effect is positive. An increase in ﬁrms’ market power as measured by the Lerner
index leads to a lower labour share, as predicted.
An important question is in how far these variables are able to explain the
signiﬁcant changes in the labour share. Table 4 tries to answer this question
by showing standardised coefﬁcients. These express by how many standard
Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
logTFP  0.719  0.675  0.631
logcapoutput  0.810  0.621  0.432
loginterprice 0.360 0.386 0.412
dlogemp  0.0698  0.0524  0.0351
  0.0555  0.0126 0.0303
lerner  0.0432  0.0141 0.0148
logwageEU 0.00130 0.0630 0.125
Table 4: Standardised coefﬁcients and 95 percent conﬁdence interval, 1980-2001
deviations the dependent variable is predicted to change after a one standard
deviation of each independent variable separately. As the typical movement
of the dependent variable is one standard deviation, a small number implies
the independent variable under consideration can not by itself be a sufﬁcient
explanation for the observed change in the dependent variable. Contrary to
common practice, the standardised coefﬁcient is reported alongside an upper
and lower boundary of an 95 percent conﬁdence interval. The standardised
coefﬁcients clearly show that it is highly unlikely that changes in the trade
freeness, changes in market power, or foreign low-wage competition can explain
15And probably affect the local labour share through different other channels in an open
economy context, which we attempt to control for by including it.
22the observed decline of the labour share. The effect of these variables is dwarfed
by the effect of prices of intermediates, for example.
Table 5 does include the c4 market concentration measure, which comes at
the cost of loosing the years 1980-1991 in the sample. Estimation is markedly
Dependent variable: loglabshare (1) (2) (3)
logTFP  0.804  0.798  0.788
(0.0460) (0.0477) (0.0473)
logcapoutput  0.199  0.195  0.177
(0.0380) (0.0392) (0.0392)
loginterprice 0.588 0.588 0.599
(0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0257)










Observations 728 728 728
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01
Table 5: Estimation of the basic equation and extensions
more precise for these later years in the sample (1991-2001). Although some of
the variables capturing the various channels of globalisation are now signiﬁcant
the standardised coefﬁcients show they are still unable to explain a signiﬁcant
share of the change in the labour share. Of all the variables considered in
the analysis, the relative price of intermediate goods turned out to have the
largest effect on the labour share, both in terms of classical and standardised
coefﬁcients. Figure 5 again shows the evolution of the labour share in our
sample, superimposed with the log of the real price of intermediates. Both
variables clearly move very much in line. In contrast to to descriptive nature of
the relationship shown in the ﬁgure, the results in this section allow to state
23Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
logTFP  0.609  0.546  0.481
logcapoutput  1.41  0.985  0.556
loginterprice 0.252 0.275 0.298
dlogemp  0.808  0.599  0.039
  0.104  0.0344 0.0357
lerner  0.102  0.0559  0.0101
logwageEU 0.110 0.219 0.328



























1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
EU15 Labour share Smoothed rel. intermediate price
Figure 5: The evolution of the labour share and the real price of intermediary inputs.
that the evolution of the price of intermediary goods such as energy is indeed
the most likely cause of the observed decline in the labour share.
Column (1) shows the results of estimating the regression of BS, where a
quadratic relationship between the capital-output ratio and the labour share
is incorporated. What transpires is that TFP , which captures the effect of both
labour augmenting technological progress (which is not predicted to affect the
LS-k schedule) and non-labour technological progress (which is expected to
shift the LS-k schedule downwards), is negative (as expected) and statistically
signiﬁcant. In addition, the coefﬁcient on prices of intermediates is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant which is in line with the ﬁndings of BS. In a non-
reported speciﬁcation, positive and negative changes in employment were
24introduced as separate regressors to allow for asymmetric adjustment costs.
The estimated coefﬁcients were 0.005(0.05) and -0.095(0.042), respectively,
suggesting adjustment costs are indeed asymmetric, with ﬁring being more
expensive than hiring.
5. Conclusion
This paper, using a number of approaches, examined the evolution of the
labour share in the EU while also exploring several explanations for these
observed changes. The paper starts out by examining the importance of com-
positional effects in explaining changes in the labour share. What transpires is
that the change in the relative weight of sectors with a relatively low labour
share in an economy has tended to decrease the aggregate labour share in most
countries. Furthermore, within sector changes have also been an important fac-
tor driving the labour share. The direction of its inﬂuence has been somewhat
ambiguous. Using detailed ﬁrm level data for Belgium, changes in the relative
weight of ﬁrms also appears to have a negative inﬂuence on the aggregate
labour share, which echoes the industry level ﬁndings. The decomposition
of yearly changes suggests cyclicality plays an important role in explaining
changes in factor shares.
As a means of examining additional factors driving changes in the labour
share, this paper builds on the framework of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003)
by examining how economic integration via declining trade costs, foreign
competition and changes in market structure, impact on the labour share. These
theoretical predications are then empirically tested and what emerges from the
data is in line with these predictions. An increase in foreign wages increases the
labour share, which is in line with the theory that weaker foreign competition
reduces the viability of relocation as an outside option for ﬁrms. Furthermore,
industry concentration measures are constructed using ﬁrm level data and it
emerges that industries with higher concentration levels are associated with
lower labour shares as predicted by theory. Freer trade and sectors with
higher markups are found not to have a statistically signiﬁcant affect on the
labour share. Apart from being non-signiﬁcant, the conﬁdence interval of the
standardised coefﬁcients of these variables, expressing how well these variables
25can explain the observed overall change in the labour share, indicates these
variables are by no means the main cause of the observed decline in the labour
share
Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that the European integration process lowered
the labour share by a small amount, if at all. In any case the effect of economic
integration and changes in the market structure is quite limited when compared
to the effects of technological change and prices of intermediary goods, such as
energy prices.
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A. Variables
 labshare = nominal labour compensation / nominal value added
 loglabshare : log(labshare)
 TFP : Measure of sector-level TFP provided in the EUKLEMS dataset.
 capoutput = capital stock index / real value added.
 interprice = intermediate input prices / gross value added price
 Dlogemp : Growth of employment.
 wageEU = (Total compensation to EU countries excluding own) / (Total
employment in EU excluding own))
 : See section 3.3
 lerner: the industry level mark-up estimated using the Hall method.
Three separate estimate are made per sector, each having a time-span of
12 years.
 C4 concentration ratio = sum of sales of four largest ﬁrms in an indus-
try/total sales in that industry
























































































































































































 compositional effect  within effect
Figure 6: Decomposition of changes in the labour share in within sector changes and changes
in the relative importance of sectors in the overall economy. The bars for both effects are
stacked if they have the same sign. The length of a bar gives the change (attributable to that



















































































































 compositional effect  within effect
Figure 7: ...Continued from last page: decomposition of changes in the labour share in within
sector changes and changes in the relative importance of sectors in the overall economy.
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